Abstract. In this paper a number of binary cyclotomic generators based on cyclotomy are described. A number of cryptographic properties of the generators are controlled. A general approach to control the linear complexity and its stability for periodic sequences over any field is shown. Two bridges between number theory and stream ciphers have been" established, and the relations between the design and analysis of some stream ciphers and some number-theoretic problems are shown. A number of cryptographic ideas are pointed out.
Introduction
The word cyclotomy means "circle-division" and refers to the problem of dividing the circumference of the unit circle into a given number, n, of arcs of equal lengths [19] . Our interest in the theory of cyclotomy has stemmed from the rather remarkable fact that the cyclotomic numbers represent actually the difference property and the nonlinearity of some cryptographic functions from residue rings Zp's to some abelian groups. The DSC and ADSC generators described in [11] are actually the cyclotomic generators of order 2. In this paper we describe some keystream generators based on the theory of cyclotomies modulo a prime p, a square of a prime, and the product of two distinct primes. These generators are all special natural sequence generators of Figure 1 [11] , where a cryptographic function f(x), which is a mapping from a residue ring ZN to an abelian group (G, +), applies to the register of the modulo N ring counter. In the upper part of Figure 1 , i.e., the modulo N ring counter, the ~N denotes the integer addition modulo N, the symbol i denotes the content of the register of the counter which is updated with each clock. Thus, the register of the ring counter outputs cycles through the elements 0, 1, ..., N of the residue ring Zlv. That is, if the register of the counter has value i at time t, then its value at time t+ 1 is (i+ 1) rood N, here and hereafter the z rood N is defined to be the least positive integer congruent to x modulo N. The semi-infinite sequence z c~ i.e., the output sequence of the * Supported partly by the Academy of Finland under Project 11281. For the binary natural sequence generator the following cryptographic analyses are equivalent:
1. differential analysis of the cryptographic function f(x); 2. nonlinearity analysis of the cryptographic function f(x); 3. autocorrelation analysis of the cryptographic function f(x); 4. autocorrelation analysis of the output sequence; 5. two-bit pattern distribution analysis of the output sequence;
6. stability analysis of the mutual information I(i; zizi+t-1), here and hereafter z ~ denotes the output sequence of the NSG. 7. transdensity analysis of the additive stream cipher system with this NSG as the keystream generator by which we mean the analysis of the probability of agreement between two encryption resp. decryption transformations specified by two encryption resp. decryption keys [11] .
By equivalence we mean one analysis results in another analysis. We now prove the equivalences between the above seven analyses and show that an ideal difference property of the cryptographic function f(x), by which we mean that the difference parameters defined below are approximately the same, ensures automatically an ideal nonlinearity of the cryptographic function f(x), an ideal autocorrelation property of f(x), an ideal autocorrelation property of the output sequence z ~ , an ideal two-bit pattern distribution property of the output sequence z ~ , and an ideal balance between the mutual information I(i; zizi+t-1) for all possible (zi, zi+t-1) E Z2 x Z2, where t is arbitrary. In what follows ZN denotes the residue ring modulo an integer N.
Consider now the NSG of Figure 1 . Assume that (G, +) is the abelian group over which the keystream sequence is constructed, and ]G I = n. For each i E G let Ci = {x E ZN : f(x) = i}. The ordered set {Co, C1, "", Cn-1} is called the characteristic class. For any ordered partition {Co, C1,'", C~-l} of ZN, there exists a function f(x) with this partition as its characteristic class. The differential analysis of the system is the analysis of the following difference parameters:
d](i,j;w) = ICi (3 (Cj + w)l , (i,j) e G • G, w E ZN.
There are some elementary facts about these difference parameters [11] , which represent some conservations between the difference parameters.
To see why the analysis of the difference parameters can be regarded as a kind of differential analyses, we take (G, +) = (Z2, +). Consider the input pairs (x, y) such that x -y = a, and consider the difference of the corresponding output pairs. These two expressions show that the difference parameters can be regarded as partial differentials or directional differentials of the function f(z).
In what follows we prove the equivalences between the above seven analyses for the binary NSG (natural sequence generator).
Equivalence between differential and nonlinearity analyses: The nonlinearity analysis of the cryptographic function f(x) refers to the analysis of the probability p(f(x + a) -f(x) = b). It can be easily seen 
(2)
Then formulae (1) and (2) show the equivalence. 
Combining formulae (3) and (4) proves the equivalence between differential analysis and autoeorrelation analysis of f(x).
The autocorrelation analysis of the output binary sequence z ~ refers to the analysis of the autocorrelation function
Apparently by the definition of the NSG we have Cz (a) = C/(a), for each a. Thus, the above formulae (3) and (4) are also true we replace 6'] (a) with Cz (a). This fact shows the equivalence between the differential analysis and the autocorrelation analysis of the output sequence z ~.
Equivalence between differential and two-bit pattern distribution analyses: The two-bit pattern distribution analysis of z ~ is concerned with how the two-bit patterns are distributed in a circle of length N in the sequence. For each 
(5)
Thus, for the binary NSG each difference parameter represents in fact the number times a two-bit pattern appears in a circle of length N of the binary output sequence z ~ .
Equivalence between differential and mutual information analyses: Given two bits z~ and zi+t of the output sequence of the binary NSG. It is cryptographically interesting to know how much information these two bits gives to the value of the register of the counter in the binary NSG at the time the output bit z~ was produced. It is easy to verify and I(i; zizi+t) = log2 N -log 2 d] (zi, zi+t; -t), bits
where the mutual information I(i; ziz~+t) is measured in bits. Formulae (6) and (7) show clearly the equivalence. In addition they show that the difference parameters are in fact a measure of uncertainty.
Equivalence between differential and transdensity analysis: In a cipher system it is possible for two keys to determine the same encryption (resp. decryption) transformation. Even if the two transformation are distinct, it is cryptographically interesting to know the the probability of agreement between the two transformations. The control of this probability of agreement can prevent a cipher from any key approximation attack, that is, to use one key to decrypt the message encrypted by another key. Let Ek (resp. Dk) denote the encryption (resp. decryption) transformation specified by the key k. The analysis of the density (briefly, transdensity analysis) of a cipher system refers to the analysis of the probability of agreement p(Ek(m) = Ek,(m)), where m can be confined on plaintext blocks or without restriction [11] .
For the additive binary stream cipher with the binary NSG as its keystream generator this probability can be expressed easily as
because of the additive structure of the additive stream cipher and the fact that the keystream sequences specified by all keys are shift versions of each other. Thus, the equivalence follows easily from formula (8) .
So far we have proved the equivMences between differential and other six analyses. Thus, the equivMences among the seven analyses follows.
In addition, there is no tradeoff between all the above seven aspects and the linear complexity and its stability aspects for this generator (we will see this fact in later sections). This means that it is possible to design the NSG so that it has not only an ideal property for all the seven aspects in the usual senses, but also a large linear complexity and ideal linear complexity stability for the output sequence. It is because of these facts and that every periodic sequence can be produced by the natural sequence generator that the generator was called a natural one [11] .
Formulae 1-8 clearly show that to ensure an ideal property for all the seven aspects, it suffices to control the difference property of the cryptographic function f(x). Thus, in what follows we will concentrate on the control of the difference property off(x), of the linear complexity, and of the sphere complexity of the output sequence of each specific NSG.
Cyclotomy and its cryptographic importance
The motivation of the investigation of cyclotomic numbers is related to the outstanding Waring problem, difference sets, and the solution of equations over finite fields [7, 9, 17] . Cyclotomic numbers invented by Gauss turn out to be quite valuable in the design and analysis of some keystream generators.
Let N = df + 1, be a odd prime and let 0 be a fixed primitive element of ZN. Denoting the multiplicative subgroup (0d) as Do, we see that the coset decomposition of Z~v with respect to the subgroup Do is then
where D~ = OiDo for 0 < i < d -1. The coset Dl is called the index class l [3] or cyclotomic class l [19] . Let (l, m)d denote the number of solutions (x, y) of the equation
which were called cyclotomic numbers [2, 3, 8, 12] , or equivalently, (l, m)a = IDl Ca (D.~ + 1)l.
Apparently, there are at most d 2 distinct cyclotomic numbers of order d and these numbers depend not only on N, d, I, m, but also on which of the r primitive elements of ZN is chosen. There are some elementary cyclotomic facts which are very important to our cryptographic applications, because they indicate several kinds of conservations between the cyclotomic numbers. They are the theoretical bases of the need of keeping the stability of local nonlinearities of some cryptographic functions.
We now see the meaning of the cyclotomic numbers from another viewpoint. As seen above, cyclotomic numbers represent in fact the difference property of the partitions {Do,D1, "" ,Dd-1}. So they should have connections with difference sets. ActuMly, the investigation of residue difference sets is the main motivation of the calculation of cyclotomic numbers [3, 19] . Now we see the cryptographic importance of cyclotomy.
Let the symbols as before. What we want to do now is to construct cryptographic functions from ZN to an abelian group (G, +) of d elements, where
Without concerning the implementation problem, we define a function from ZN to (G,-t-) as: f(x) = gi iff x e Ci.
If i. j r 0, then we have
On the other hand, we have
It follows that
Similarly, we have
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that the difference parameters are almost the same as the cyclotomic numbers.
A basic theorem and main bridge
Before describing some binary cyclotomic generators, we introduce the sphere complexities and show why it is necessary to control the sphere complexity for those cyclotomic sequences described later. Let x and y be finite sequences of length n over GF(q), WH(z) denote the Hamming weight, and dH(x, y) --WH(x -y), the Hamming distance between x and y. Let O(x, y) = {y: 0 < dH(X, y) < u} be the sphere without center x. The sphere complexity [10] is defined by
here and hereafter L(x) denotes the linear complexity or linear span of x.
Similarly, let s ~ be a sequence of period N (not necessarily least period) over GF (q) . The sphere complexity [10] of periodic sequences is defined by where per(too) = N denotes that too has a period N, and t N = totl...tN-1.
That the control of the sphere complexity of keystream sequences for additive synchronous stream ciphers is cryptographically necessary follows from the fact that there is a polynomial-time algorithm which determines a LFSR with approximately the same output as the original keystream sequence, provided that the linear complexity of the keystream sequence has a bad stability. This algorithm can be roughly described as follows.
If the sphere complexity SCk(s ~176 = l of the binary semi-infinite sequence soo is small for some very small integer k, then theoretically the sequence soo can be written as Soo : too -I-Woo, where s ~176 t ~ and w ~ all have a period N with respect to which the sphere complexity is concerned, and L(t ~) = l, and the Hamming weight WH(w N) ~ k. The task of this polynomial-time algorithm is to construct a LFSR of length l which produces the sequence t ~ or another LFSR which outputs a sequence with the probability of agreement with the original sequence soo no less than
Suppose that a cryptanalyst gets a piece of the sequence soo, say S. Then the piece must be written as S = T + W, where T and W are the corresponding pieces of the periodic sequence too and woo respectively. Since the k is very small, with a very high probability, which depends on the length of S and the pattern distribution of s ~176 , it holds S = T. In this case if the length of S is large than 2l, then applying the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [14] to S will give an LFSR which produces the sequence t ~ with the probability of agreement with soo being no-less than 1 -k/N.
If S r T, the Hamming weight of S -T must be very small since k is very small. Then by changing a few bits in S the cryptanalyst gets T. However, he/she does not know the actual sequence S -T. But he/she can first get a number of sequences Si by changing only one bit in the ith position of S for all i, in this way he/she gets m modified versions of S, where m is the length of S. Then apply the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to each modified version to get a LFSR. After that use these LFSRs to decipher a long piece of ciphertext. If one LFSR has a probability of correct decipherment no less than 1 -k/N, then the cryptanalyst accept this LFSR for approximating the original keystream generator. Otherwise changing two bits each time in S gives m(m -1)/2 modified versions of S, then apply the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to these modified version to see whether an acceptable LFSR is obtained. If not, try to modify three bits to get m(m -1)(m-2)/6 versions, and apply the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to the modified versions again. Since k is very small, the cryptanalyst must get an acceptable LFSR after repeating the procedure a number of times. Since the complexity of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm is of order O(m2), where m is the length of the input sequence, the complexity of this approximation algorithm must be polynomial. The smaller the k, the less the complexity of this approximation algorithm. This algorithm clearly shows the importance of the sphere complexity. It is quite clear that if SCr r = l is small, with the above algorithm a cryptanalyst must succeed in get a LFSR with the probability of agreement with the original generator larger or equal to 1 -6/N. We describe the above algorithm here in order to show the cryptographic necessity of controlling the sphere complexity for our binary cyclotomic sequences for additive stream ciphering. The necessity of controlling the linear complexity of keystreams for additive stream ciphering follows from the efficient BerlekampMassey algorithm. After having shown the need for controlling the linear and sphere complexity for cyclotomic sequences, we now prove some theorems which will be needed when we control these complexities for those sequences. Proof: Let K be a field of characteristic p, the n a positive integer not divisible by p, and ~ a primitive nth root of unity over K, the nth cyclotomic polynomial is defined by
To prove the theorem, we need the following properties of the cyclotomic polynomial (see Lidl and Niederreiter [13] for proof).
Qn(x)
is independent of the choice of ~.
deg(Qn(x))
The coefficients of Qn(x) belong to the prime subfield of K. 
x" -1 = I-[din Qa(z).
Thus, the conclusions of this theorem follow. QED One can see that the above lower bound is optimal. Ift = 1 and el = 1, then we have the general lower bound for sequences of a prime period. Ift = 1, then it gives a lower bound for the linear complexity and sphere complexity of sequences with period being a prime power. Most of the theorems and corollaries in the paper are special cases of the above basic theorem, that is why we call it a basic theorem. We say that it is a bridge between number theory and stream ciphers because it makes a clear connections between the linear and sphere complexity of sequences and quite a number of number-theoretic problems such as primes of special forms (e.g., Sophie German primes, Stern primes, twin primes) and their distributions, primality testing, primitive roots and their distributions, and primitivity testing. Some of these connections will be made clear in This basic theorem shows that it is usually quite easy to control the global linear and sphere complexities. However, it seems fairly difficult to control the local linear and sphere complexities. It is worthy to note that here we use the speciality of period to control the linear and sphere complexities, while some cryptographic functions are traditionally used to control the global linear complexity in the literature. Thus, we stress the importance of period.
Cyclotomic generator of order 2k
Binary sequences with prime period are cryptographically attractive due to the following theorems about the linear and sphere complexities, which follow easily from Basic Theorem 1. 
SCk(s ~) = O, otherwise.
Proof: By the special form of the prime N it is easy to see that 2 is a primitive root modulo N. Then the conclusion of this theorem follows from Theorem 1. It is not difficult to verify that each difference parameter of the above cryptographic function H(x) for the binary cyclotomic generator of order 2k can be expressed as the sum of k 2 cyclotomic numbers of order 2k. Thus, if the cyclotomic numbers of order 2k have an ideal stability, the formulae in Section 1 show that we have an ideal property for the seven aspects described in Section 1 if k is small enough. Even if the cyclotomic numbers of order 2k are stable to an ideal extent, the largeness of the k may lead to a relatively bad difference property of the cryptographic function. Thus, only those generators derived from small k are cryptographically attractive.
Theorems 1-5 clearly show how to control the linear complexity and its stability for the output sequence of the binary cyclotomic generator of order 2k. By Theorem 1, to control the linear complexity and its stability of the output sequences of the binary cyclotomic generators, it suffices to choose the prime N such that ordN (2) is large enough. The best choices for the primes are Sophie Germain primes, i.e., primes p such that 2p+ 1 is also a prime, and Stern primes, i.e., primes p = 4t + 1 with t also prime. If k = 1, then it is called the binary cyclotomic generator of order 2. The binary cyclotomic generators of order 2 can be further classified into DSC (difference set characterized) and ADSC (almost difference set characterized) generators which correspond the cases N = -1 mod 4 and N = 1 mod 4, respectively [11] . In the case k = 1 the output sequence of the DSC and ADSC generators are the 0-1 version of the Legendre sequences with a slight modification of the values for (~) for i = 0, 1,..-, and a proper choosing of the prime p.
A DSC generator with a Sophie Germain prime has the following cryptographic attributes: its output sequences have maximum linear complexity by Theorem 3; best autocorrelation property by the formula for cyclotomic numbers of order 2 or the difference set property of the set f-l(1) and formula (3) (1) . The ADSC generator with a Stern prime has almost the same cryptographie attributes.
5 Two-prime cyclotomic generator of order 2
Let p and q be two distinct odd primes with gcd(p -1, q -1) --2, and /~={0}, P={p, 2p,. If r E P (or Q), then x d-i E P (or Q).
For the partition Do,..., Dd-1 of Z~v and w r 0, combining the above results we obtain
w~Q, w~P;
(i ~, f)a for some (i~, f), otherwise.
In order to put the elements of R, P, Q to some of the Di's to get a partition of ZN with good difference property, we need the following result proved by Whiteman [21] : To analyze the function, we need the generalized cyclotomic numbers of order 2 obtained by Whiteman [21] .
Let symbols as before. If ff' is even, we have (0, 0) = (1, 0) = (1, 1) and two different cyclotomic numbers
If fff is odd, we have (0, 1) = (1, 0) --(1, 1) and
We now analyze the difference property of the partition {Co, C1} of Zpq. In addition we have apparently I(P + r) nQI = I( P+ r) n D01 = I(D1 + r) n R I = 0
Hence, we obtain in the case r E P 1+ (p-1)(q-4 1) _< dc(1,0;r) _< (p-1)(q-4 1) +P.
If r E Q, we can similarly prove (p-1)(q4 -1) _< dc(1, 0; r) _< (p-1)(q4 -1) +q-1.
If r E Z~q \ P U Q u R, then by the formulae (10) and (11) we get
In addition we have apparently This theorem tells us that if IP -q[ is small enough, the cryptographic function Fc(x) has an ideal difference property. Thus, the other six aspects are automatically ensured due to our formulae in Section 1. In this case, the facts that Ic01 = (;-1)(q -1)/2 + q and ICll = (p-1)(q -1)/2 + p-1, show that the function has also good balance. It is called a cyclotomic generator because the difference property and the nonlinearity of the above cryptographic function depend on the generalized cyclotomy developed by Whitman.
It is not difficult to see that the characteristic function of the partition {Co, C1} can be expressed by 1,
(1 + (ps163 otherwise.
With this cryptographic function the binary two-prime cyclotomic generator of order 2 is depicted in Figure 2 , where p and q are distinct odd primes and k = 1, the | and @ denote bit multiplication and bit-XOR operations, and the other parts have the same meanings as those of Figure 1 . On the other hand, the two primes should be chosen properly for the purpose of controlling the linear complexity and the linear complexity stability of the output sequence. In fact we have generally the following result, which is a special case of Basic Theorem 1. 
L(s ~) > min{ordr(u), ords(u)};

SCk(s c~ >__ min{ordr(u), orals(u)}, ilk < min{WH(sN), N -WH(sN)}, where SCk(s ~176 denotes the sphere complexity of the sequence, WH(s N) the Hamming weight of the finite sequence, ordr(u) the order of u modulo r.
Proof: Setting t --2 and el = e2 = 1 in Basic Theorem 1 proves this theorem. QED As consequences of the above theorem, we have the following corollaries:
Corollary8. Let r -= 4t1+1, s -= 4t2+1, r ~ s. If r, s, tl and t2 are odd primes, then for any nonconstant binary sequence of period N = rs,
L(s ~~ > min{r-1, s-1}
SCk(s ~176 > rain{r-1, s-1}, ilk < min{WH(sN),N -WH(sN)}.
Proof: Note that the proof of Theorem 2 shows that ordr (2) --r-1 and ord8 (2) 
L(s ~) > min{r-1, s -1}; 2. SCk(s ~) > min{r-1, s-1}; ilk < min{WH(sN),N -WH(sg)).
Proof: The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 show that 2 is common primitive root of both r and s. Combing this and Theorem 7 proves this corollary. QED The above theorem and its three corollaries clearly show how to control the linear complexity and its stability for the output sequence of the binary twoprime generator of order 2.
Summarizing the above results, we see that the parameters should be chosen such that 1. p and q both are large enough with gcd(p-1,q-1) --2; 2. IP -ql is small enough, compared with pq; 3. ordp(2) and ordq(2) both are large enough.
It should be made clear that the special properties of the primes p and q determine partly the quadratic partition of the primes, and thus contributes to the stability of the cyclotomic numbers, and consequently to the difference property and other six aspects described in Section 1.
Generally speaking, the two-prime generator is more flexible, due to the fact that we have much freedom to select the primes.
The best choices for the p and q are the twin primes. They ensures the best difference property and nonlinearity of the cryptographic function according to generalized cyclotomic numbers of order 2 (see [21] ). In this case the output sequence of generator is the characteristic sequence of the twin-prime difference set with parameters (.N, h, A) = (p(p ~ 2), (N -1)/2, (g -3)/4) (see [21] ). Note (2t + 1) 2 ,if p= 4t + 1; n=h-A= 4t2, ifp=4t-1.
It follows from [11] that the linear complexity of the output sequence is N or N -1, provided that p = 4t+ 1. Ifp = 4t+ 1, then N+2 = 4(t+ 1) -1. It follows that p and p + 2 has no common primitive root 2 if p = 4t + 1. Nevertheless, the output sequence has best linear complexity. Ifp = 4t -1, it is possible for p and p + 2 to have common primitive root 2. Assume that they have common primitive root 2, then by Theorem 7 we have
L(z ~176 > p-1;
SCk(z ~) _> p-1, if k < min{WH(zN), N-WH(z~)}.
Because the eryptographic function is the characteristic function of a twinprime difference set, all the seven aspects described in Section 1 are optimal.
The output sequence of the two-prime cyclotomic generator of order 2 is an extension of 0-1 version of the Jacobi sequence in the sense that the values at the special sets Q, P and R are modified. In addition, the condition that gcd(p-1, q-1) = 2 is essential to the generator. It is because of this condition that the generalized cyclotomic numbers of 6rder 2 ensure an ideal difference property of the cryptographic function. Without this condition it cannot be called a cyclotomic generator.
6
Two-prime generator of order 4
To design cryptographic functions from Zpq to Z4, we follow the same approach as in the foregoing sections. Let p = 4f + 1 and q = 4f ~ + 1 with gcd(f, f/) = 1. 
F(j) = O, j E {p, 2p,.'., (q-1)p}; ((j(q-1)/4 rood q) mod 2) G ((j(p-1)/4 modp) mod 2) @ 1, j E Z;,q.
With this F(x) we describe a generator based on the generalized cyclotomy of order 4, as depicted in Figure 2 with k = 2.
If we define the function F*(x) from Z~q to Z~ by
F*(j) = ((j(q-1)[4 mod q) mod 2)@ ((j(p-1)/4 modp) mod 2)| 1, j E Zpq.
Then it is easy to know that F*(x) has characteristic set C1 = Di U Dj t2 Q, where Q = {0, q, 2q,..., (p-1)q), Di and Dj are two of the four generalized cyclotomic classes developed by Whitman [21] . Thus, an ideal stability of the generalized cyclotomie numbers of order 4 ensures an ideal difference property and nonlinearity of the above function F(x). Fortunately, the generalized cyclotomic numbers of order four have an ideal stability [21] . Thus, it follows from the formulae in Section 1 and the relation between cyclotomic numbers and the difference parameters described in Section 2 that we have ensured an ideal property for all the seven aspects described in Section 1.
The control of the linear complexity and its stability for the output sequence of the binary two-prime cyclotomic generator of order 4 is the same as that of order 2. By Theorems 6 and 7 the parameters should be chosen such that 1. p and q both are large enough with gcd(p -1, q -1) = 4; 2. IP -q[ is small enough, compared with pq; 3. ord v(2) and ordq(2) both are large enough.
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Prime-square generator Sequences with period of the square of a odd prime are cryptographically attractive due to the following theorems about their linear complexity and linear complexity stability which follow easily from Basic Theorem 1.
Theorem 11. Let r be a odd prime, N = r e and q an integer with gcd(q, N) = 1.
Then for any nonconstant sequence of period N over GF(q),
L(s ~176 > ordr(q) ; 2. SC~(s ~) > ord~(q), ilk < min{WH(sN),N -WH(sN)}.
Proof: Setting t = 1 in Basic Theorem 1 proves this theorem. QED
Theorem 12. Let r be a odd prime, N = r 2 and q a primitive root modulo r and r 2 does not divides q,-I _ 1, then for any nonzero sequence of period N over GF(q),
n( s ~176 must be equaI to one of { v/-N, v/'N-1, N-x/7, N-x/T + I, N-I, N ) ; 2. SCk(s ~176 _> x/-N-1, /fk < min{WH(sg), g-WH(sg)).
Proof: Since q is a primitive root of r and r 2 does not divides q~-i _ 1 by assumptions, it is known that q must be a primitive root of r 2 (for proof, see [1] ). Thus, by the basic properties of cyclotomic polynomial presented in the proof of Basic Theorem 1 we know that the cyclotomic polynomials Qr (z) and Qr~ (z) are irreducible over GF(q). Again from the properties of cyclotomic polynomials it follows
x N -1 = (x-1)Qr(x)Qr~(z).
Note that deg(Qr(x)) = r -1 and deg(Q~(x)) = r(r -1) since q is a common primitive root of r and r 2. Combining these fact and the fact that the minimum polynomial of each sequence of period N over GF(q) divides x N -1 proves this theorem. QED Thus, the best primes p for binary sequences of period p2 are the nonWieferich primes with base q, i.e., those described by the above theorem, which is related to the Fermat quo~ien~ and some other number-theoretic problems. We prove these two theorems here because we need them to control the linear and sphere complexities of the output sequences of the prime-square generator.
If we choose one of the following functions for the cryptographic function of Figure 1 , where N = p2, then we have the binary prime-square cyclotomic generator. To describe the difference property of the above two cryptographic functions, we give a brief introduction to the cyclotomic numbers modulo p~. Let p be a odd prime. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem there is a common primitive root a modulo both p and p2. Setting Do = (a2), a multiplicative subgroup of Zp~, and D1 = c~D0. Then the eyelotomic numbers of order 2 modulo p2 are defined by (l, m)= = n (Din + 1)1, 0 < l,m < 1.
We need the following theorem, which was conjectured by the author and proved by D. Pei [16] , to ensure an ideal property for all the seven aspects described in Section 1. O) --p(p -1) 4
m+p.
----p.
Let {Co, C1} be the characteristic class of the above function Fc(x), then similar to Section 2 it is easily verified that the difference parameters of the above function are approximately the same as the four cyclotomic numbers defined for the modulus N = p~. Thus, an ideal difference property and therefore an ideal property for the other six aspects are ensured by the formulae described in Section 1.
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Behind the cyclotomic generators
There are several cryptographic ideas behind the construction of these cyclotomic generators. The first one is the order of choosing the design parameters for the generator. Contrary to the traditional approach, we first control the period of the output sequence. This will automatically ensure the linear complexity and its stability aspects only with the condition that the sequence is not a constant sequence. Then we choose the cryptographic function for other purposes. This approach is intended to avoid unnecessary tradeoffs. The second cryptographic idea behind the design and analysis of cyclotomic generators is the idea of introducing good partners, in order to get a stable system. In particular, we search for pairs of period and finite field so that it is easy to control the linear complexity and its stability for those sequences over those fields with corresponding partner periods. This has been shown clearly by the theorems and corollaries concerning linear and sphere complexities. We say that such pairs work in harmony with respect to the aspects of linear complexity and its stability. For example, some Mersenne and Fermat primes are not good partners of the field GF(2), since it is difficult to control the linear complexity and its stability for binary sequences with period of some Fermat and Mersenne primes. This is because that the order of 2 modulo these primes is quite small. From Basic Theorem 1 and its corollaries it is rational to use ordN(q) as a measure on the partnership between an positive integer N and an integer q with respect to the linear and sphere complexity aspects when designing sequences of period N over GF(q), where gcd(N, q) = 1. We say that q and N are the best partners when q is a primitive root modulo N.
Another kind of partnership is to find an integer r which is a power of prime such that lcm{ord m (r),..-, ordp~ (r)} is large enough when designing sequences of period N = Pl"" "Ph over GF(r), where Pl,'",Ph are distinct primes (see Basic Theorem 1). We say that r is a best common partner of Pl, 9 9 ", Ph if r is a common primitive root of these primes.
The third cryptographic idea is to use some techniques of ensuring "good + bad = good". With a simple argument each cryptographic function employed in the generators described in the foregoing sections can be expressed as H(a(.) ), where G(x) is a mapping from ZN to U which is a subgroup of the group (Z~v , .) with order d, and H(x) a mapping from U to Zd. The nonlinearity of G(x) with respect to (ZN, +) and (U, .) is determined mainly by the (generalized) cyclotomic numbers of order d, which usually have an ideal stability; while the function H(x) is almost linear (or with good linearity) with respect to (U, .) and (Zd, +). Thus, it is clear that one cryptographic idea behind the cyclotomic generators is "GOOD + BAD = GOOD".
The fourth cryptographic idea is to use cryptographic functions f(x) from an abelian group (G1, +) to another abelian group (G2, +) such that [G2[ does not divide [GI[. We say that such a func.tion is linearly non-approximatable, since there is no linear mapping other than the zero constant function from (G1, +) to (G2, +). This technique makes any linear approximation attack with respect to the two operations out of sense. It should be pointed out that the nonlinearity definition based on the minimum correlation (measured in probability of agreement, or distance [15] between a function and all affine functions) is not rational in many cases. This definition makes no sense for the above cryptographic functions.
The fifth cryptographic idea is to make use of the relativity about nonlinearity and linearity. It is a common fact that the nonlinearity and linearity are relative to the operations considered, and that both linear components and nonlinear components should be employed in many cipher systems. To find out some cryptographic functions with good nonlinearity with respect to some operations, one may try to find some linear cryptographic function with respect to some other operations and use them in the context of the former operations. This is to say that bad things in one sense may be good ones in another sense, and one way to get goodness is to use badness in a proper way and proper context. To illustrate this philosophy, we first take the corresponding function G(x) = x (p-1)/d mod p used to construct the cyclotomic generator of order 2k. Then G(x) is linear with respect to (Z~, .) and (U, .), where U is the multiplicative subgroup of Z~ with order d. But G(x) has ideal nonlinearity with respect to (Zp, +) and (U, +) if we define G(0) to be any fixed element of U..And we use G(x) in the context of the later pair of operations exactly. The same idea has been used for other generators.
To illustrate the relativity of linearity and nonlinearity, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 14. For every nonzero linear function L(x) from F = GF(q m) to K = GF(q) with respect to the additions of the two fields, its nonlinearity with respect to (F*, x) and (K, +) is optimal, as described by
which holds for c~ E F with a # 1, and each b E K.
Proof: For any nontrivial linear mapping L(x)from F to K the kernel L -1 (0) is an Abelian subgroup of (F, +) and thus L(z) takes on each element of K equally likely, that is, q,~-I times. Confining the linear mapping on F* = F \ {0} and using the above fact proves the theorem. QED This theorem clearly shows the cryptographic importance of linear functions from F = GF(q rn) to K = GF(q) with respect to the additions of the two fields, especially the trace functions. Actually all the cryptographic functions for the cyclotomic generators are composition functions of linear functions with respect to different pairs of operations. It may be possible to employ this idea to design some block ciphers.
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Some related number-theoretic problems
In the paper at least two bridges between some number-theoretic problems and the design and analysis of the natural sequence generator have been established. These bridges may play an important role in the interactions between number theory and stream ciphers, and particularly in the design and analysis of the cyclotomic generators described in this paper. The first one is the bridge supported by Basic Theorem 1 and the theorems and corollaries concerning linear and sphere complexities. The reason for calling it a bridge has already made clear in Section 3. Obviously, there are more results which can be derived from Basic Theorem 1. If we go across this bridge from the stream cipher side, we shall encounter at least the following two basic numbertheoretic problems when we are designing sequences of period N over GF(q) with ideal linear and sphere complexities (see Basic Theorem 1). Attacking these two basic problems and many of its subproblems and variants will involve many, if not most, number-theoretic problems. Among them are the searching for special primes, such as Fermat primes, Mersenne primes, Stern primes, prime repunits, and twin primes, the distribution of special primes, primitivity testing, the distribution of primitive roots. These facts have already been shown clearly by all the theorems concerning the linear and sphere complexities proved in this paper. We need special primes for these generators, and have to know whether they exist. And if they exist, we have to know how to find large special primes.
Basic Problem 1
We need not only twin primes for our twin-prime generator, but also special twin primes. The most interesting twin primes are those having a common primitive root 2 (the best common partner of the twins). However, some twins have, others don't. Problems as to which twins have the common primitive root 2 and how to find them are naturally important to the design of the twin-prime generators. By introducing sexes to twin we can solve one cryptographic problem for the twin-prime generator.
Let (p,p+2) be a pair of twin primes and p = Z(p) mod 4, where ~(p) = +1. Then we call ~(p) the sex characteristic of the twins. If the twins (p,p + 2) = (4t-1,4t + 1) for some t, then we say that the twins have the same sex; otherwise, we say that they have different sexes.
In the above definitions, we say that twin primes (p, p + 2) have same sex, because in the expression of the form 4u =t: 1, the u's for both p and p + 2 are the same, and have therefore the same parity, ifp = 4t -1. Ifp = 4t + 1, then p + 2 = 4(t + 1) -1 and t and t + 1 have different parities. That is why we call them twins with different sexes. This discussion has also proved the following property of twins. Proof: With the help of the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity it is easy to see that a necessary condition for 2 to be a primitive root of a prime N is N = 8k • 3 for some k. Combining this fact and the definition of sexes proves the theorem. QED Thus, the cryptographic importance of classifying twin primes into two classes according to their sexes for the design of the twin-prime generator clearly follows from the above theorem. Before searching for twins with the same sex, we have to know the distribution of the two classes. Solving this problem and searching for twin primes with the same sex are important design problems for the twin-prime generator.
The second bridge we set up when we design these cyclotomic generators is supported by the relations between the difference parameters of the cryptographic function f(x), and the nonlinearity measure, the autocorrelation functions, mutual information, and two-bit pattern distributions, as described by the formulae in Section 1.
At one side of the second bridge are the autocorrelation property, the twodigit pattern distribution property of the output sequences, and the difference property and nonlinearity of the cryptographic functions of the NSG; while at the other side are cyclotomy-related problems and the Riemann Hypothesis for Curves over Finite Fields, which was proven to be true by Weft in 1948 [20] .
We call it another bridge between number theory and stream ciphers because it makes a clear connection between the above set of cryptographic problems and the set of number-theoretic problems.
Related to cyclotomic numbers and their stability are the quadratic partition of primes and of some integers, the theory of quadratic forms, genus theory, class field theory, residue difference sets, group character, and character sums. In what follows we give a brief explanation to why these problems are related to the design of the cyclotomic generators. It is a pity that we cannot show here how some of these problems are related to the design and analysis of the cyclotomic generators since doing so must involve quite a number of number-theoretic concepts. However, pointing out some relations between design problems of cyclotomic generators and a number of number-theoretic problems might be helpful for those who are interested in these generators. Let us begin with the stability of cyclotomic numbers.
We now consider the binary cyclotomic generator of order 4 in Section 4. Let N = 4f + 1 be a chosen prime for the generator. Let N = x 2 +4y 2, x = 1 mod 4, here y is two valued, depending on the choice of the primitive root [8] . There are five possible different cyclotomic numbers in the case f even; i.e., (0,0), Although these formulas show a roughly ideal stability of cyclotomic numbers of order 4, the actual stability depends on the quadratic partition p = x 2 -4-4y 2 and x = 1 mod4. If there is a big difference between Ixl and ]yh then there is a considerable difference between the cyclotomic numbers. And it is not difficult to give examples to show there do exist primes such that there is a considerable difference between z 2 and y2 in their quadratic partitions. Thus, choosing large special primes to ensure better stability of cyclotomic numbers is cryptographicMly necessary.
There are two approaches to do this. The first approach is to use traditional methods to get first large primes. Then use some special algorithm to get the partition and see whether it results in an ideal stability of cyclotomic numbers. This special algorithm should be related to classical problems about quadratic partitions such as the number of solutions of such a quadratic partition. Another approach is to consider directly for given n the set {x 2 + ny 2 : x,y E Z}.
If there are infinitely many primes in the set, we can search for the primes which give an ideal stability of cyclotomic numbers. With this approach the first problem we have to solve is whether there are infinite many primes in the above set. The Dirichlet theorem about primes in arithmetic progression does not help here. However, with some results from class field theory we can get a positive answer for each n [5] .
If one has a quick look at eaci~ set of cyclotomic formulae known today, one will find that they have the same form. Behind this uniformity of all cyclotomic numbers is the Riemann Hypothesis for Curves over Finite Fields, which can be described as follows. This theorem, proven by Weil [20] , not only indicates the uniformity of the form of cyclotomic formulae, but also can be used to set up bounds for pattern distributions in the output sequences of the cyclotomic generators. With the Weft Theorem one can see some cryptographic meanings of the genus of curves. For details about the Weft Theorem, the reader is referred to [18] . Since cyclotomic numbers are related to characters and character sums [8, "9, 12] , the cyclotomic generators are naturally related to character and character sums. In fact many of the cryptographic functions f(x) employed here are group characters.
One part of the design and analysis of these eyclotomic generators is to solve the following basic prQblem at the number-theory side of the second bridge. For our cryptographic application we hope that A ~ B means that A is as near to B as possible. But for the flexibility of the solutions of the above basic problem, we give such a definition of A ~ B.
The characteristic function of a partition {Co, C1} of ZN satisfying (12) ensures that it has an ideal difference property, and therefore an ideal property for the other six aspects described in Section 1. But to ensure an ideal pattern distribution property for various pattern lengths is to solve the following more general basic problem.
Basic Problem 4 Let C =-{C0,C1} be a partition of ZN, ro, rl which is equivalent to x = 5 or 3. This proves the theorem. QED For other power residues it is not difficult to see whether they form a.d. sets by employing the cyclotomic numbers of various orders. In general, it is not easy to find a.d. residue sets. It is noted that difference sets and almost difference sets are employed in the cyclotomic generator of order 2 and in the twin-prime generator. So they are closely related to cyclotomic generators.
Another solution to Basic Problem 3 is to make use of power residues and cyclotomic numbers generally, as done in the foregoing sections. One advantage of the sets of power residues is that they form multiplicative groups, and this makes the implementation problem of characteristic functions of the corresponding partitions simple. There may exist other solutions to Basic Problem 3, which remains to be investigated.
The condition (12) can only give a very rough guarantee for other conditions in (13) . The cyclotomic numbers and the Weil Theorem seem to indicate that partitions based on power residues give ideal solutions to Basic Problem 4. In fact we can set up bounds of order N -t-O(v/N) for these higher order difference parameters Dio...i,_l(ro,.. ',rs-1) for 8 > 3 based on the Weil Theorem when N is a prime, but the bounds becomes more and more looser with the increase of s though the bounds remain in order N -4-O(v/-N).
We pointed out a number of number-theoretic problems here, since they are essential to the design and analysis of cyclotomic generators. For other type of generators there may be other related number-theoretic problems, such as the class numbers for imaginary quadratic fields which are related to properties of some number-theoretic generator [4] .
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Concluding remarks
Since we have controlled the difference property of the cryptographic functions and the linear and sphere complexities of the output sequences of the binary cyclotomic generators, the formulae in Section 1 and theorems and corollaries regarding the linear and sphere complexities show that these generators have the following properties:
1. the cryptographic function f(x) has an ideal difference property;
2. the cryptographic function f(x) has an ideal nonlinearity with respect to the additions of ZN and Z2; 3. the cryptographic function f(x) has an ideM autocorrelation property; 4. the affine approximation of f(x) with respect to (ZN, +) and (Z2, +) makes no sense, since there are only two trivial affine functions from ZN to Z2 for odd N; 5. the output sequence has an ideal autocorrelation property; 6. the output sequence has an ideal two-bit pattern distribution property; 7. the output sequence has ideal linear complexity and linear complexity stability;
8. the mutual information I(i; zizi+t-1) has an ideal stability, here z ~ denotes the output sequence of the NSG; and 9. the additive stream cipher system with this NSG as the keystream generator has an ideal density of encryption (resp. decryption) transformations, i.e., the probability of agreement between two encryption (resp. decryption) transformations specified by two keys is approximately 1/2.
In fact we can calculate exact values of measures (such as autocorrelation values, the mutual information) for the above aspects based on the formulae in Section 1 if we have formulae for the difference parameters. For example measures for the above aspects for the cyclotomic generator of order 2 can be expressed exactly in terms of N, the modulus for the modulo N ring counter. If we have bounds for the difference parameters, then using the formulae in Section 1 gives bounds for measures on the above aspects. In addition, the Weil Theorem and the formulae of cyclotomic numbers seem to indicate that the output sequences of these cyclotomic generators have an ideal distribution property for any pattern with length 1 < 1 < [log 2 NJ.
In this paper we consider only some binary cyclotomic generators. It is possible to extend the results for binary cyclotomic generators to cyclotomic generators over other fields. For the linear complexity and sphere complexity of periodic sequences over other fields we have similar results.
The performances of these cyclotomic generators are basically of the same order, since they are M1 based on the exponentiation-modulo-N operation. It seems that these generators are not fast, but with a fast exponentiation algorithm it is possible to get a reasonable performance if the moduli are not too large. For the time being moduli having about 64 bits seems enough for the generators. Though the generators are not fast, they might have an ideal security. Thus, trading performance for security might be possible.
Finally we mention that some related work about some randomness aspects of the Legendre and Jacobi sequences was done by Damgs [6] .
